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I Introduction
This article is based on a review of macroeconomic
evaluations of balance of payments (BOP) support
from Sweden.' The review was largely a presenta-
tion of methodology major conclusions and lessons
learnt from around a dozen evaluations of Swedish
BOF support carried out between 1988 and 1995.
In a short article like this, it would be impossible to
present and do justice to all these different - and
increasingly sophisticated I evaluation reports. The
purpose is more limited, and intentionally malign:
instead of focusing on valuable insights and analy-
ses, of which there are many I will discuss a num-
ber of problems related to scope and methodology
with particular emphasis on key questions that
have not been answered adequately
Some of the problems identified represent genuine
methodological pitfalls: the limitations of the
'before' and 'after' approach in evaluations of struc-
tural adjustment programmes, the lack of credible
counterfactuals, the difficulties in separating the
effects of certain policy changes from the effects of
the increased aid flows that tend to accompany
adjustment policies, and others.
To judge from the evaluations of Swedish BOF
support under review there are also, however, a
number of questions that tend to be neglected for
the simple reason that the agency whose aid was
evaluated did not ask for answers.
A convenient point of departure is the Terms of
Reference (TOR). Every evaluation is - or should be
- consistent with the TOR for the evaluation in ques-
tion. For aid donors, who usually commission their
evaluations from outside consultants, it is therefore
of paramount importance to write their TOR in a
way that captures the key issues to be addressed.
The review on which this article is based placed
much emphasis on a discussion of the TOR for
each evaluation. Which were the questions that the
consultants were asked to answer, and which were
the issues that were neglected?
The present article begins with a brief overview of
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and of the present situation as regards major objec-
tives, guidelines and modalities for this form of aid.
The major purpose is, however, to discuss remain-
ing problem areas related to the methodology of
BOP evaluations. Some suggestions are also made as
to how aid agencies can enhance the usefulness of
future evaluations by broadening the focus to
include more socio-political aspects of structural
adjustment lending and policy-related assistance.
2 Historical Evolution of Swedish
Balance of Payments Support
2.1 General Objectives of Swedish
Development Assistance
The overriding objectives of Swedish development
aid are to support, in the recipient countries, eco-
nomic growth, economic and social equity, democ-
ratic development, national independence and,
finally, environmental protection and sustainability
All these five objectives need not, of course, be
reached simultaneously in each and every country
or development project.
2.2 The Early Phase of Commodity
Support and Import Support
Balance of payments support - or, as it was called in
the past, commodity support and, later, import sup-
port - has generally aimed at reaching the growth
objective. In many countries, this form of assistance
has also been justified with reference to the objective
of supporting national independence. This was, for
example, the case with several countries in Southern
Africa when South Africa was under white minority
rule, Nicaragua during the 1980s, and Vietnam during
its period of heavy dependence upon the Soviet bloc.
Occasionally, 'positive lists' of goods to purchase for
particular target groups - such as school books to
primary education, or incentive goods to small-scale
farmers - have been established in order to make
Swedish commodity aid meet the equity objective.
Support to democratic development and environ-
mental protection has played an entirely subordi-
nate role in Swedish import support programmes,
except in an indirect way when countries in a
process of democratization can be said to have been
'rewarded' with additional BOP support.
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Both objectives and modalities of Swedish BOP
support have, however, undergone important
changes during the past decade.
During the 1970s and early 1980s, import support
was regarded as a residual, a somewhat inferior form
of aid which complemented traditional project and
sector aid when lack of administrative capacity at SIDA
(Swedish International Development Cooperation
Agency) or in the recipient country made it difficult to
disburse the entire country allocation on 'high-quality'
development assistance. The major advantage with
commodity aid was that it was regarded as quickly dis-
bursed and easy to handle. In general, the justification
for this aid form was simply that the country in ques-
tion suffered from a shortage of foreign exchange, and
that an easing of the foreign exchange constraint
would stimulate economic growth.
Most of the countries with a low absorptive capac-
ity of project aid were also characterized by weak
administrations and poor macroeconomic policies.
The result of the tendency to regard import support
as a gap filler when ordinary development assis-
tance appeared too difficult was therefore, some-
what paradoxically, that the 'messier' a particular
country was, the more likely was it that Sweden dis-
bursed a high percentage of the country allocation
on import support.
When reading SIDA's documentation about import
support from this period, one is struck by the lack
of macroeconomic analysis. Although import sup-
port represented over 30 per cent of Swedish bilat-
eral aid - and some 15-20 per cent of all Swedish
ODA - between the mid 1970s and mid 1980s, the
justifications provided were meagre. Quite often, it
was only stated that the country in question suf-
fered from balance of payments problems, and that
additional foreign exchange was 'needed'.
Sometimes, reference was made to the administra-
tive and procurement capacity of the recipient
country; if found to be inadequate, SIDA's own pro-
curement division was normally responsible for the
actual purchasing procedures.
In the course of the 1980s, macroeconomic con-
cerns became more and more pronounced in the
international and Swedish debate about develop-
ment assistance. Largely as a result of the protracted
debt crisis, and the huge macroeconomic imbal-
ances that surfaced in a large number of developing
countries, the role of a sound macroeconomic envi-
ronment as a precondition for successful develop-
ment was increasingly emphasized by the
international donor community.
As part of this international trend, Sweden started
to pay more attention to macroeconomic issues, and
developed more elaborate guidelines for balance of
payments support.2
Shortage of foreign exchange remained an impor-
tant criterion, but the shortage should mainly be
due to external factors - i.e. a sudden deterioration
of the countrys terms of trade - rather than being
the result of inappropriate domestic policies. In
SIDAs Guidelines for Import Support from 1985,
this point is formulated in the following way:
Should the economic policies pursued by the
recipient country be the main cause of the for-
eign exchange shortage, this should influence the
volume and/or orientation of import support.
The phrase 'orientation of import support' indicates
that SIDA, by earmarking import support funds for
purposes supposedly not affected by overall macro-
economic policies, could keep the amount of import
support unchanged even in the face of 'bad policies'.3
Certain import support funds could, it was hoped, be
used in a 'system neutral' way, i.e. be effectively utilized
even in an unfriendly macroeconomic environment.
As before, the recipient country should have a satis-
factory administrative capacity to utilize the foreign
exchange provided. Mainly for reasons related to
administrative convenience, preference should be
given to relatively large purchases of bulky commodi-
ties. The destructive role played by a grossly overval-
ued rate of exchange was observed, and caution with
commodity support was recommended in such cases.
2.3 Debt Crises, Macro
Conditionality and Increased
Coordination with the IFIs
Towards the mid 1980s, the debt crisis played an
increasingly important role in the Swedish debate on
2 The first SIDA memo putting emphasis on
macroeconomic issues in relation to import support was
written in 1984 (Styme 1984).
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development assistance. When the concept 'balance
of payments support' first appeared in the Swedish
budget bill, the one for fiscal year 1985/86, it was
expressly destined to poor countries with acute bal-
ance of payments difficulties due to the heavy debt
burden. The countries receiving such assistance did
not necessarily have to be so-called 'programme
countries', i.e. the twenty odd list of major recipients
of Swedish bilateral aid, but could also be countries
with which Sweden provided soft loans and techni-
cal assistance through the Swedish Agency for
Technical and Economic Cooperation (BITS).
Swedish BOP support could also be used to clear
arrears under publicly guaranteed credits to devel-
oping countries. In such cases, the money never left
Sweden, and the major part of these outstanding
debts - for example, Swedish export credits to
Nicaragua or Mozambique - would never have been
serviced in the absence of Swedish funds. The
macroeconomic impact in the 'recipient' countries
of the bailing out of Swedish creditors can there-
fore, in most cases, be assumed to be negligible.
The new aid instrument could also, as from the late
1980s, be used for joint actions with other bilateral
donors and the IFIs in connection with structural
adjustment agreements. For example, Swedish pol-
icy-related import support to Zambia expanded
rapidly in 1985/86, when Zambia embarked upon a
comprehensive Fund-supported programme for
economic reform. In Tanzania, where Sweden for
many years had irritated the IFIs by supporting
Tanzanias refusal to sign an agreement with the
Bank and the Fund, Sweden gave, in 1986, its full
support to the Economic Recovery Programme
designed by the IFIs. In these and similar cases,
Sweden stated that programme support would be
conditional upon the implementation of structural
adjustment programmes. Sweden also started to
play an active role in various 'support groups' which
were formed to facilitate negotiations with the IFIs,
and to provide bridging finance to clear outstanding
arrears to preferred creditors.
In the 1986/87 budget bill, it was explicitly stressed
that Swedish BOP support had as one of its major
This point is stressed in Lundström (1988), which
contains a useful summary of the Swedish discussion
about programme aid, including BOP support, in the
1980s.
objectives to support structural reforms in develop-
ing countries. Similar, but more emphatic, state-
ments were made in the 1987/88 and 1988/89 bills,
where the need to establish a close coordination
with the IFIs was stressed. Rather large funds were
also set aside to support the Fund's SAF/ESAF facil-
ity, and the World Bank's special programme for
debt-distressed, low-income countries in Africa.
The tendency in the latter half of the 1980s is thus
clear: more and more emphasis on sound economic
policies as a precondition for import support/BOP
support, and a closer cooperation with the IFIs in
connection with structural adjustment programmes.
By and large, Sweden accepted the hegemony of the
IFIs in macroeconomic matters, and accepted the
macro conditionality imposed upon recipient coun-
tries undergoing structural adjustment.
The actual application of the new guidelines for
import support, and of the coordination with the IFIs,
was rather 'soft', however. As a result, the perverse
relationship between sound economic policies and
Swedish BOF support indicated earlier was largely
maintained; in 'difficult' countries, with a low absorp-
tive capacity of project aid, disbursements were res-
cued by gap-filling import support. For example,
Sweden continued to provide import support to
Zambia after this countly's break with the lETs in
1987, although the volume was reduced. A country
like Angola, which by any standards pursued
extremely poor macroeconomic policies, remained a
major recipient of Swedish import support.
As late as 1988/89, around one-third of all Swedish
import support was given to countries such as
Zambia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Nicaragua and
Vietnam, which at that time lacked agreements with
the IFIs and which were all characterized by severe
macroeconomic dislocation and by overvalued, or
extremely overvalued, exchanges rates. Almost fifty
per cent went to two countries, Mozambique and
Tanzania, with huge macroeconomic disequilibria
and overvalued exchange rates but with recent
agreements signed with the IFIs.
2.4 Present Situation
In the 1990s, BOF support as an aid form has
become further upgraded, at least in words, and is
now recognized as a perfectly legitimate component
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of Swedish development assistance. Its volume has,
however, declined, both in absolute terms and as a
percentage of total Swedish aid.
Following an international trend, the modalities for
Swedish BOP support have become more diversi-
fied. In addition to traditional import support, BOF
support today includes a wide variety of instru-
ments, such as co-financing operations in support
of structural adjustment programmes, direct debt
relief, support to the Fifth Dimension (to handle
arrears to the World Bank), and to the Sixth
Dimension (buy-back operations of commercial
debt). In relative terms, these new modalities only
represent a rather small share of all Swedish pro-
gramme aid, however.
Guidelines and Principles
The old notion of a foreign exchange bottleneck -
the legacy of 'gap theories' which provided the the-
oretical underpinning of import support since the
early days of development assistance - remains
intact, and preference should be given to countries
with a shortage of foreign exchange. The emphasis
has, however, shifted from simple gap analyses to
broader issues related to macroeconomic policies
and conditionality
The fact that a large number of major recipients of
Swedish aid have introduced market-based systems
for the allocation of foreign exchange has also
blurred the distinction between a shortage of for-
eign or domestic currency In a number of Sweden's
'programme countries', domestic funds are at least
as scarce as foreign exchange, and Sweden is today
providing direct budget support to complement tra-
ditional BOF aid in a few countries.
Budget support to sector programmes receiving
Swedish development assistance is since long a
well-established part of Sweden's bilateral aid.
3 Evaluations of Swedish Balance
of Payments S)upport
There are several 'vintages' of evaluations of Swedish
BOP support. In the early and mid 1980s, a number
of reports and evaluations were undertaken by SIDA
and by the National Audit Office in order to assess
the effectiveness of Swedish import support.
All the early reports - before around 1988 - con-
centrated either on procurement and administrative
procedures, or on the effects at the micro, or enter-
prise, level.4 Usually, the TOR did not even mention
macroeconomic issues, and the choice of consul-
tants revealed a preference for professionals with
limited knowledge and interest in such areas.
As from the late 1980s, macroeconomic aspects began
to play a more pronounced role in the TOR. In the lat-
est vintage, the evaluations undertaken in 1994-95,
macroeconomic issues had gained complete hege-
mony, and the evaluations had become quite
advanced, from a methodological point of view Also,
the focus of attention had changed from an analysis of
the use of the particular commodities purchased with
Swedish funds to assessments of the recipient coun-
tries overall macroeconomic policies. However, while
the shift in emphasis from procurement procedures to
macroeconomics signified a giant step forward as
regards the policy relevance of the evaluations, a
number of issues remained unaddressed.
To begin with, macroeconomic evaluations of the
impact of aid still lack an established methodology.
All attempts to assess the effectiveness of policy-
related assistance in a rigorous manner suffer from
the same basic flaws: the limitations of the 'before
and after approach', and the difficulties in establish-
ing a credible counterfactual.
Ideally, when assessing the impact of programme
aid with the explicit objective of supporting eco-
nomic reform, the line of causation should not be
limited to an analysis of how aid may affect invest-
ment, growth, income distribution, inflation, etc.
Perhaps more importantly, the effects of aid should
be analyzed in a policy context, i.e. how aid plus
conditionality leads to changes in economic policies
which, in turn, have an impact on investment,
growth, income distribution, etc.
These issues are, however, rarely addressed in the eval-
uations. One reason is, of course, that it would be dif-
ficult; there is no convenient methodology to measure
to what extent macro conditionality is successful in
making governments do what they dont like to do.5
These early reports are not included in the list of
references below, which only contains evaluations with
some macroeconomic focus.
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As regards Sweden s specific impact on macro poli-
cies via BOP support, most evaluations - largely fol-
lowing their TOR - take the hegemonic role of the
IFIs, and the modest role of Sweden, for granted.
Only in the case of Vietnam (Faber 1992) is
Swedenis stand in the policy dialogue explicitly rec-
ognized (as marginal, but marginally constructive
and valuable). In a couple of other cases, the
authors indicate that they would have liked to see a
more active role played by Sweden. Most of the
evaluations are, however, silent on the issue of
actual and potential contributions of Sweden in the
macroeconomic policy dialogue.
When assessing the impact of economic reform pro-
grammes, the authors of the various evaluations
have also encountered a series of other problems.
To begin with, the time span has often been too
short; most evaluations were undertaken just a few
years after the initiation of the reform programmes.
Even when the quality of data allowed the authors
to quantify relevant macroeconomic events, which
was far from always the case, reform programmes
can seldom be assessed with reference only to their
short-term impacts.
A comparison between expected outcome - as pre-
sented in, for example, Policy Framework Papers,
statements to the Consultative Group meetings in
Paris, or in World Bank and IMP documents - and
actual outcome would have been useful, however.
Only one such comparison is attempted (White,
1994c). This is somewhat surprising, in view of the
fact that a very common criticism of IFI-supported
structural adjustment programmes has been that
the IFIs tend to be overly optimistic in their fore-
casts about short and medium-term effects. A num-
ber of such programmes have, in fact, been
'marketed' as a fast road to economic growth; when
growth has been lower than expected, problems of
domestic credibility have become aggravated.
Apart from the problem of the limited time period
and lack of good data to quantify programme per-
formance, all evaluations - whether the authors
acknowledge it or not - encountered the well-
known difficulty of distinguishing whether it is ceT-
The pioneering attempt by Mosley et al. (1991) to use
game theory to analyse the effectiveness of macro
conditionality is highly stimulating - it also reveals,
however, the limitations of this approach.
tain policies, or the additional aid flows that accom-
panied the policy changes, that produced a certain
outcome. Even worse: a third factor may be largely
responsible. Correlation does not say anything
about causation. The collapse of agricultural pro-
duction in Zimbabwe shortly after the launching of
the economic reform programme was, to take an
extreme example, caused primarily by drought, and
it would be exceedingly unfair to put the blame on
the structural adjustment programme.
The criteria used when assessing success or failure
of the respective SAPs mainly refer to means rather
than ends. Or, put in another way: policy instru-
ments, rather than actual economic achievements,
are used to distinguish good' and 'bad' perfor-
mance. The implicit assumption is that if a number
of policy indicators - liberalization of the foreign
trade and exchange regime, austere monetary and
fiscal policies, privatization of state enterprises, and
others - move in the right direction, growth will fol-
low This need not, however, be the case, and a
wealth of data presented in the various reports actu-
ally reveals that many countries which get high
marks by following orthodox prescriptions have
suffered badly in terms of economic growth,
employment, real incomes, export performance,
and private investment.
Very few evaluations raise explicitly the question:
What would have happened in the absence of
macro conditionality plus aid? A common approach
in most evaluations is simply to discard past poli-
cies as unsustainable and erroneous, and to regard
adjustment policies as both desirable and
inevitable. In a way, it is difficult to disagree: a
majority of countries under review - which include
such 'difficult' cases as Zambia, Tanzania, Guinea-
Bissau, Mozambique, and Nicaragua - had, for
example, accumulated external deficits which sim-
ply made a continuation of past policies impossible.
The need to make adjustments irrespective of the
IFIs and donor conditionality is hardly ever men-
tioned in the evaluation reports, however, and the
possible outcome of alternative adjustment policies
is rarely considered explicitly (one partial exception
is the attempt to construct a counterfactual balance
of payments for Zambia in the 1995 evaluation).
It may however be observed that the great success
story among the countries where Swedish BOP
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support has been evaluated - Vietnam - actually
carried out comprehensive and successful reforms
without agreements with the IFIs, and at a time
when aid flows were being drastically reduced
(extremely energetic reforms were implemented in
Vietnam in the interregnum between the collapse
of Soviet aid and the resumption of Western assis-
tance).
Very few reports contain a critical discussion of the
role played by the IFIs. By and large - with just a
few exceptions - the evaluations, and their TOR, are
based on an implicit credo: 'There is no alternative.'
The IFIs are assumed to be basically right, while the
adjusting countries would do wrong, if they were
allowed to do what they would like to do.
The whole issue of the incentive structure sur-
rounding structural adjustment lending is rarely
touched upon in the evaluation reports. The 1992
report on Guinea-Bissau, however, draws attention
to the IFIs' desire to design programmes which
facilitate debt service payments to the preferred
creditors, apparently to the detriment of the coun-
try in the case of Guinea-Bissau. Mwanawina and
White (1995) raise a question related to incentives,
namely the issue of ex ante conditionality versus ex
post assessment of performance, and argue strongly
in favour of the latter.
While the seriousness of distorted incentives in
connection with structural adjustment programmes
can be discussed, potential critical areas that might
be addressed in evaluations could include the fol-
lowing, partly overlapping, issues:
incentive problems related to the high marginal
tax on good performance on the external
account implicit in the 'financing gap'
approach;
the danger of a soft budget constraint being
introduced by benevolent donors and lenders
equipped with disbursement targets and an
optimistic outlook;
the danger of programme aid being used to bail
out bad performers year after year, and the role
of the IFIs as 'fund raisers' among bilateral
donors to rescue poorly designed and imple-
mented SAPs;
the multiple roles played by the IFIs as pre-
ferred creditors, major macroeconomic 'advis-
ers' and coordinators of part of the bilateral aid
and of other creditors at the same time. It is
easy to imagine the intellectual chain-saw mas-
sacre that clever World Bank economists would
launch on a financial institution with so many
different and conflicting roles - if it were situ-
ated in Africa instead of in Washington.
Returning to methodology, it may be observed that
the control group approach has not been tested in
any of the evaluations. One reason could be that all
countries were treated as special cases; there is a
striking paucity of references to other countries
experiences in all individual country studies.
There is also a serious shortage of countries eligible
for control groups. While all countries are different,
adjustment policies have been amazingly similar. In
Sub-Saharan Africa, where a majority of evaluations
of Swedish programme aid have been made, virtu-
ally all countries have undergone IFI-designed SAPs
in the last ten years; the only notable exceptions are
a few countries which are either good macroeco-
nomic performers (such as Botswana, Tunisia or
Swaziland) or the exact opposite (such as Liberia or
Angola). It is, for this and other reasons, next to
impossible to make comparisons between 'adjust-
ing' and 'non-adjusting' countries. Indeed, struc-
tural adjustment, supported by macro
conditionality and programme aid, has influenced
policy-making - even in countries without formal
agreements with the IFIs - to such an extent that it
has had a large impact on economic policies in
developing countries almost everywhere, and in
particular in Africa.
Very few evaluations address the issue of the extent
of 'ownership' of the respective adjustment pro-
grammes. In a couple of cases (mainly Martin on
Guinea-Bissau and Mwaniwana and White on
Zambia), the authors highlight lack of domestic ini-
tiative and ownership, and regard the fact that poli-
cies have been largely donor-driven as a serious
problem.
It is, in my view, to be regretted that the TOR for the
evaluations in no single case asked for at least a ten-
tative analysis of the 'political economy of economic
reform'; after all, structural adjustment is about pol-
loo
itics. While the TOR became increasingly sophisti-
cated as regards, for example, various aspects of
fungibulity, or the impact of countervalue payments
on the fiscal deficit and monetary supply, they
remained silent on key issues related to 'ownership',
and degree of domestic political credibility While
some evaluations, largely on the initiative of the
evaluators themselves, discussed income distribu-
tion effects of the adjustment programmes, and of
BOP support, few systematic attempts were made to
identify key groups of 'winners' and 'losers' in order
to assess the balance of forces, and the constituency
for a continuation - or discontinuation - of the
reform programmes.
In a way, one could say that the TOR for the evalu-
ations became 'too macroeconomic' in the sense
that while more and more attention was paid to tra-
ditional macroeconomic variables mainly related -
directly or indirectly - to the growth objective, the
other four objectives of Swedish development assis-
tance were quite neglected in the TOR for the later
generations of evaluations. The imbalance that thus
developed may have limited the relevance of the
evaluations; while a reallocation of intellectual
input in favour of macroeconomic analysis was
clearly justified initially, and gave promising results,
such endeavours may have been subject to dimin-
ishing returns in a later phase.
A striking illustration of the tendency to focus
almost exclusively on macroeconomic issues in a
rather narrow sense is the fact that in no case was a
social scientist outside the discipline of economics
invited to participate in an evaluation of Swedish
BOP support. To broaden the analysis to include
other social sciences than economics may, in future
evaluations, be a useful means to enhance our
understanding of the driving forces behind 'good'
and 'bad' economic policies, and of the role that
policy-related assistance can play
Participation from other social sciences may also
serve to broaden the focus to include, for example,
gender issues. No evaluation makes even a brief ref-
erence to the fact that adjustment policies are far
from gender-neutral; the authors do not even seem
to be aware of the wealth of literature on structural
adjustment in a gender perspective that has been
written in recent years. The gender perspective is
also absent from all TOR.
It may finally be mentioned that certain politically
sensitive areas, which might be of some relevance
within the context of BOF support and programme
aid, are consistently avoided in the TOR as well as
in the evaluation reports. For example, while erro-
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